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American Jewish opinion about the Arab-Israel conflict matters for both American and 
Israeli politics as well as for American Jewish life. This paper undertakes an analysis of 
that opinion based on American Jewish Committee (AJC) annual polls. Recently, the 
AJC made the individual-level datasets for the 2000–05 period available to researchers. 
The paper focuses on opinion about the future of the West Bank (including East 
Jerusalem), because survey questions on that topic are relatively straightforward. 
Standard background variables (religious, cultural, political, and demographic) are all 
seen to be modestly related to opinion about the West Bank (in simple crosstabulations 
and multivariate analysis). However, with the exception of Orthodoxy, no factor is 
dramatically connected to particular opinions. Also, despite evidence of a positive 
association between age and emotional attachment to Israel, age is also positively 
associated with willingness to accept proposed West Bank changes. Finally, a generalized 
concern about security seems to account for some of the diversity of opinion about the 











American Jewish opinions about the Arab-Israel conflict matter for both American and Israeli 
politics, as well as for American Jewish life. Yet for all the discussion about Israeli policy 
options in Jewish circles, and about the appropriate role for American Jews and their 
organizations, there is relatively little systematic research on American Jewish public opinion 
about the conflict.
1 This paper offers such research, through an analysis of annual surveys of 
American Jewish opinion during 2000–2005. The American Jewish Committee (AJC) has 
carried out these surveys for more than two decades (AJC 1983–1997, 1998–2007).
2 During the 
past year, the AJC greatly enhanced the value of the survey data for the years 2000–2001 and 
2003–2005 by making the individual-level datasets available to researchers (North American 
Jewish Databank 2007). Consequently, we can now explore in detail which Jews hold which 
opinions; for example, we might have noticed in AJC survey reports that the more traditionally 
observant and the older Jews held a given opinion, but we could not determine how much each 
characteristic mattered alone. Now we can answer such questions. I used those individual-level 
datasets in order to probe further what we can say about American Jewish opinion about the 
conflict. I found that the most straightforward questions about policy options and, hence, the 
most illuminating responses concern the issue of the future of the West Bank, including East 
Jerusalem. These are the most politically important of the territories captured by Israel in the Six 
Day War of 1967. 
The Arab-Israel conflict has persisted for six decades and the Arab-Zionist conflict had 
persisted for nearly as long before the creation of the Jewish state. The focus of the conflict has 
                                                 
1 There have been a very few national surveys of the American Jewish population—notably the NJPS (National Jewish 
Population Survey 1970, 1990, 2000–01) and the AJIS (American Jewish Identity Survey 2001), but these have not asked 
questions about specific Middle East policies of the Israeli or American government (Perlmann 2007a). The many national polls 
of American opinion, such as the General Social Survey, often ask respondent’s religion, but the number of Jews in a typical 
national survey will be small (roughly 30 in a 1,500-person sample) and the number of questions relevant to the Israeli and 
American policy will be few. Americans for Peace Now (APN), together with the Arab-American Institute, has produced several 
recent political polls, but relatively little evidence on how those polls are conducted is publicized, there is no breakdown by 
American Jewish subgroups (how Orthodox and Reform Jews might differ, for example), and the polling data has not been 
placed in the public domain. On the APN polls, see also below. 
2 The Committee’s own analyses of the survey data has varied over the years; the reports were much more fulsome and rather 
more pointed in drawing conclusions in the early years when they appeared over the names of researchers (most were authored 
by Steven M. Cohen). However, for more than a decade now, they have been issued simply over the name of the Committee; and, 
in the most recent report (AJC 2006), the discussion amounts to a two and half page introduction to the tables. In the extensive 
published tables, respondent choices are presented both for the Jewish population as a whole and for subgroups of Jews (by age, 
gender, education, religious orientation, and so on). The tables are useful, but one is left with the impression that “the facts” are 
supposed to “speak for themselves.” As I will explain later, there are also other problems with the AJC surveys, especially 





changed several times during this long period. Indeed, during the past three or four years alone, 
the conflict seems to have evolved again: Israel is physically out of the Gaza Strip, an Islamic 
revival looms large, and tensions with Iran have moved closer to center stage. Despite such 
lurches, however, the West Bank issues remain critical to any solution. 
   The evidence available is of course imperfect, but it is more imperfect than it need have 
been. The American Jewish Committee deserves great credit for making these datasets available. 
On the other hand, the AJC’s description of its survey methods is far too brief, unchanging from 
year to year (Perlmann 2007d). Any sample has strengths and limitations; we need to know more 
about the particular characteristics of these surveys.
3 The AJC surveys are also limited because 
they select only people who identify as Jewish by religion. The point is not that there may be 
proud Jewish secularists out there—the last of the Yiddish socialists, for example. In fact, many 
Jews who call themselves secularists answer that they are Jewish when asked their religion. 
Rather, the real issue today is that the offspring of the intermarried make up two-thirds of people 
with recent Jewish origins who reply “none.” How these people should be treated in surveys of 
American Jews is a question that will not go away. All we can do for the moment is to note three 
points: 1) the number of such people is likely to increase greatly in the coming years; 2) 
including such people in the survey samples would noticeably increase the proportion of people 
who are especially distant from a traditional religious outlook; but 3) such a modification 
probably would not drastically shift most other results presented here (Perlmann 2007b, 2007c).
 4  
Finally, the questions that are included in the survey are frustrating and imperfect. True, 
the rapid upheavals in the nature of the conflict can make questions asked in one year irrelevant 
even a year later; and even questions that are asked regularly seem to carry different meanings as 
the conflict changes. For this reason and others, it is not easy to define what to ask American 
                                                 
3 In the early years, AJC survey reports occasionally included rather more useful description of samples (AJC 1995). The 
Committee should return to that style of reporting.  
4 I am not familiar with extensive scholarly studies of the AJC surveys; the individual-level public-use datasets have only been 
available for a few months. However, even studies based on the AJC reports of the annual data are rare. An important one is 
Phillips, Lengyel, and Saxe (2002), which includes some 30 pages reviewing AJC survey data on attitudes about Israel and Israel-
Arab conflict (in the course of a much longer report covering other subjects as well). I have learned from their work, and refer to 
it below. My own purposes differ in several respects from those of the Brandeis report. That report focused primarily on 
historical trends in responses and primarily on the responses of all American Jews taken as a whole, rather than on differences 
among subgroups of American Jews (young/old, New Yorkers, others, Orthodox/Reform, etc). Also, of course, their report ends 
with the 2001 survey, whereas I deal the surveys of 2000 through 2005, and especially with 2003–5. Critically, too, I deal with 
the raw data of the surveys—not merely the published tables of the reports. A related strand of work by Steven M. Cohen 
concerns the American Jewish “distancing” from Israel, some of which Cohen suggests may be related to political estrangement. 
Cohen and Kelman (2007) is the most recent to date and provides a list of many others. See also discussion of age in Part II of 





Jews about the conflict. And of course, there is also a limit to the number of questions that can be 
asked of even the most patient respondent.
5  
  Nevertheless, the AJC questions on political attitudes relevant to the Arab-Israel conflict 
could be more probing—more specific, less ambiguous, and formulated with an eye to 
uncovering the extent and sources of disagreement (as well as agreement) between American 
Jews and Israeli government policy. I do not mean to say that the AJC has not asked such 
questions in the past, or even that it never does so today, but more pointed and wider ranging 
questions in this regard would help (see Appendix B for a review of some pointed AJC questions 
from earlier years and the responses to them).  
A glaring case in point is the absence of questions about the fact of occupation itself. The 
core of peace-camp criticism, after all, is the occupation; and the responses are clear as well: 
peace-camp criticism lacks context and holds Israel to an impossible standard. Is it not 
reasonable to wonder how American-Jewish opinion shapes up on this most central matter?
6  
Of course, the wording of questions is notoriously important, too. Consider the contrast 
between results in the AJC surveys and recent surveys conducted jointly by Americans for Peace 
Now and the Arab-American Institute (APN-AAI, carried out for them by the Zogby polling 
organization). Both sets of surveys ask about support for a Palestinian state. The wording of the 
AJC survey question is: “In the current situation, do you favor or oppose the establishment of a 
Palestinian state?”
7 Roughly 55% of respondents favored and 40% opposed establishment during 
2000–2005 (Appendix Table A1). By contrast, the APN-AAI poll has been conducted three 
times since 2002; between 82% and 90% of American Jews supported a Palestinian state each 
time.
8 The APN-AAI poll question asks about a future context created by a “negotiated peace 
agreement between Israelis and Palestinians that included the establishment of an independent, 
                                                 
5 Also, I know nothing about how these particular questions were chosen, refined, and perhaps pretested. But then, the reason for 
my ignorance is the silence in AJC publications about such issues. 
6 Obvious subtopics include: 1) the degree of force used by the Israel military occupation; 2) the issues involved in maintaining 
checkpoints within the West Bank (rather than between it and Israel); 3) the tradeoffs in either case between hardships on 
Palestinians and security for Israeli citizens; 4) the tradeoff in Israeli economic policy between funding West Bank settlements 
and helping Israeli citizens (and towns) in poverty; 5) Israeli government control over anti-Arab actions by civilian settlers. In 
general, the fact that American governments (at least those prior to the present one) have routinely defined the West Bank 
settlements as illegal could be used to construct questions dealing with the wisdom of settlement for its own sake or for greater 
Israeli security. Finally, a question actually asked about the “separation fence” could distinguish between building it on the green 
line and building it on confiscated land within the West Bank so as to protect Jewish settlements that have been placed there. 
7 In some years, the first word of the question is changed to “given” from “in.” 
8 The following report of the Zogby poll comes from Zogby (2007) and APN (2007). Differences between the AJC and Zogby 
polls are numerous, although it is difficult to say much that is precise because the details of sample selection are even sketchier 





secure Palestinian state alongside an independent, secure Israeli state, and resolved final status 
issues of Jerusalem, refugees, and borders.” While both surveys are used to discuss the 
proportion of American Jews who “support a Palestinian state,” they are really dealing with two 
quite different scenarios: one is the present with all its tensions; the other is a future in which 
everything (including the unspecified boundaries of that state) has been worked out. Surely this 
difference accounts for a hefty part of the huge percentage point difference in opinion favoring a 




Within its own terms of reference, the AJC question on the Palestinian state is straightforward 
enough. Two other questions on West Bank territory (including East Jerusalem) are also useful: 
“In the framework of a permanent peace with the Palestinians, should Israel be willing to 
compromise on the status of Jerusalem as a united city under Israeli jurisdiction?” and “As part 
of a permanent settlement with the Palestinians, should Israel be willing to dismantle all, some, 
or none of the Jewish settlements on the West Bank?” We can make some headway with these, 
relating them to a variety of background characteristics of the respondents.
9  
Nevertheless, one caveat must be added when these questions are described as relatively 
straightforward. The questions call for positions, not for the reasoning behind the positions. 
Particularly in the case of the West Bank, the reasoning behind the positions cannot be assumed. 
For example, is a position to support Israeli settlements on the West Bank based on an argument 
that the land: 1) was conquered in a defensive war; 2) is historically Jewish; 3) was divinely 
promised; 4) is a buffer keeping the border farther from Jerusalem and Tel Aviv; or just 5) a 
bargaining chip for future negotiations. Israeli Jews have had a hard time sifting these 
arguments; so much the more so American Jews. After all, how much knowledge about political 
choices lies behind the American Jewish opinions? Generally Americans are notoriously 
ignorant of world affairs, and we reviewed some evidence earlier that showed large fractions of 
American Jews unable to answer basic questions about Israel. We would need much better data, 
                                                 
9 In the light of the preceding discussion about the present vs. future time context for the Palestinian state question, notice that 
these two additional questions about the West Bank are posed in connection with a final peace settlement, not “in the current 





then, to understand exactly why American Jews support the positions they do concerning the 
West Bank; but of course, we can gain some insight from which Jews support which positions. 
While the three questions about proposed West Bank changes remain relevant in 2007, 
our respondents answered them between 2000 and 2005. That the political judgments have not 
changed appreciably since the time they were asked is shown by comparing across those 
individual years, and in 2006 as well, the most recent survey (see Appendix Table A1). 
Nevertheless, it is worth remembering the political context of the years 2000-2005, for which we 
have the datasets. The Olmert leadership, the war with Hezbollah, the role of Iran’s 
Ahmadinejad, the Hamas victory in local Palestinian elections, and the Hamas seizure of Gaza 
all occurred after the last of our surveys. A brief chronology of major events during the period 
follows. 
 
July 2000  Camp David II fails 
 
September 2000  Sharon visits Temple Mount; Al Aksa Intifada begins 
 
September 14–8  AJC 2000 survey  
 
January 2001  Taba negotiations halted; Sharon sweeps election 
 
June 2001  Series of deadly terrorist attacks begins 
 





AJC 2001 survey  
 
March 2002  In wake of further terror attacks, IDF reoccupies West Bank 
areas; Arafat restricted to his compound 
 





AJC 2003 survey 
 
April 2004  Sharon announces plan to withdraw from Gaza Strip 
 









AJC 2004 survey 
 





Settlers and IDF leave Gaza Strip 
 
November 2005  Sharon dissolves coalition, leaves Likud, establishes Kadima 
Party (Nov. 21) 
 
November 14–27  AJC 2005 survey 
 
January 2006   Sharon incapacitated; Olmert succeeds to head of Kadima and 
election victory 
 
Even before the first of our surveys, the great peace effort of Camp David II and its 
aftermaths had largely played out. Sharon was about to come to power during the earliest of 
these surveys and was still in power at the time of the last. The 9/11 attacks occurred before the 
second survey. Finally, Sharon’s decision to withdraw from Gaza hovered over the last two years 
of the survey period.  
 
Some Considerations about Respondents Background Characteristics 
I focus especially on Jewish attachment and traditional Jewish religious orientation as two 
features of Jewishness. Another nondemographic measure is general political orientation. Two 
demographic characteristics expected to be important as well are age and place of residence. 
Finally, information on several other cultural orientations (such as emotional attachment to 
Israel) and background characteristics (gender and household income) will also be useful.  
 
Jewish Attachment vs. Traditional Religious Orientation 
One critical trend in contemporary American Jewish life is the attenuation of Jewish attachments 
among many with Jewish origins, so it is reasonable to ask whether criticism of, or distance 
from, Israel is coming principally from those with severely attenuated Jewish attachments. We 
have a direct measure of Jewish attachment in the question “How important would you say being 
Jewish is to your daily life?” Fifty-three percent of all respondents chose “very important,” 35% 





occasion, to restrict attention to respondents who report that being Jewish is “very important” to 
their daily lives. With this restriction, we cut the sample down to 55% of its entire size. Thus, the 
restriction is severe; recall, too, that respondents did not have to choose “not important” as an 
alternative to “very important.” They could also choose “somewhat important,” which might be 
regarded as the safer, middling response and, in fact, most respondents who did not chose “very 
important” opted for it. So when we examine separately the group who chose “very important,” 
we will be setting the bar high, not merely excluding those with the most severely attenuated 
affiliations. True, the judgment about attachment is subjective to the respondent, but I think that 
is in fact what we are after—a criterion that ensures we are left with individuals who care about 
the group identity that landed them in the sample in the first place.  
For traditional religious orientation, I combined the answers to an AJC question about 
synagogue (or temple) membership with the question about religious orientation itself, 
subdividing Conservative and Reform orientations into affiliated and unaffiliated.  
Now we should expect a strong association between Jewish attachment generally and 
traditional religious orientation in particular. And that expectation is confirmed. Those who 
reported that being Jewish is very important to them comprise 95% of the Orthodox, 78% of 
affiliated Conservatives, 52–61% of unaffiliated Conservatives and affiliated Reform Jews, and 
30–34% of the unaffiliated Reform and those who say that they are “just Jewish” (rather than 
identifying with a religious denomination; Table 1). However, at the same time, only some 15% 
of all respondents who say that being Jewish is very important to their daily lives are Orthodox 










                                                 
10 Put another way, half of those who report that being Jewish is very important to them come from the two-thirds of respondents 






Table 1. Jewish Attachment by Traditional Religious Orientation 
1a. All Respondents
Question Response                          % by traditional religious orientation
      Conservative
Very important 95 78 52 61 34 30 55
Somewhat important 4 22 40 37 55 42 35
Not very important 1 2 7 2 12 28 11
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Religious attachment All respondents 9 24 10 17 13 27 100
1b.  Selected Subgroups of Respondents





Very important 55 51 42
Somewhat important 35 37 43
Not very important 11 12 15
Total 100 100 100
Percent of all respondents  100 91 67
Notes: Based on AJC survey years 2000, 2003-2005.
Source: the individual-level datasets from the AJC surveys for 2000-2001 and 2003-2005, available through the North 
American Jewish Databank.
Reform
affiliated unaffiliated affiliated unaffiliated
Orthodox
How important would you say 
being Jewish is in your own life?
How important would you say 











The distinction between the two dimensions is critical because there will be a natural 
tendency to wonder whether hesitancy about, or criticism of, Israel comes from respondents 
whose Jewishness is, in fact, severely attenuated. The measure of Jewish attachment allows us to 
anticipate that question without having to use traditional religious orientation as the criterion for 
eliminating the severely attenuated.  
 
The Impact of Demographic Factors on Respondents’ Jewish Attachment and Traditional 
Religious Orientation 
In half a dozen large Jewish communities and in a score or more others of at least moderate size, 
we can expect a more developed Jewish institutional life and a greater likelihood that Jews there 
will interact often with other Jews than elsewhere (Goldscheider 2004). Of these communities, 
New York stands out as by far the largest. Also, quite apart from any density of resources there, 
the New York region is distinctive because the Orthodox are much more concentrated there—
comprising 18% of its Jewish respondents, compared to 5% in the rest of the country. And so, for 





their daily lives; yet when the Orthodox are omitted, the geographic difference disappears (50% 
to 49%). For such reasons, outcomes related to traditional religious orientation or to Jewish 
attachment may well be related to place of residence. 
Our expectations in relationship to age are similarly tied to Jewish attachment and 
religious orientation: insofar as Jewish attachment is generally lower among younger as 
compared to older birth cohorts, age will again be related (inversely here) to whatever is 
associated with attachment. Various observers, notably Steven M. Cohen and his associates, have 
referred to this pattern as “distancing” across historical time from Israel or from both Israel and 
Jewishness (Cohen and Kelman 2007).
11 On the other hand, it is possible that the difference in 
emotional attachment to Israel between older and younger cohorts observed at a given moment in 
time reflects life-cycle differences, not historical change. In this interpretation, younger adult 
Jews tend to be less emotionally attached to the Jewish state, but as they grow older they feel 
more attached. We cannot choose one interpretation over the other without access to datasets 
collected over a long period of time, in which respondents of the same age can be observed in 
surveys from different years: for example, people 35–44 years of age in 1980 and 2005.
12 But for 
our present purposes we need not resolve this interpretive puzzle; it is enough to digest the 
empirical point that age and emotional attachment to Israel are positively correlated, other things 
being equal. 
As it happens, other things are not equal, and this expectation must be modified to take 
into account the finding that the Orthodox (with very high attachments to things Jewish and to 
Israel in particular) are also more prevalent among the younger compared to older adult 
respondents—15% in the 24–39 age group as compared with 7% in each of the older groups (40–
59 years of age and over 60). The Orthodox prevalence among the young adult respondents may 
be somewhat related to fertility rates and is probably related also to problems of sampling.
13 Here 
                                                 
11 The Cohen and Kelman report reached me too late to be more fully compared with my paper. The age trends are actually 
somewhat weaker in the AJC data than in the recent Cohen and Kelman report (and there is little difference between the two 
younger cohorts, 24–39 and 40–59). Some of the difference across the studies may be due to two technical issues: in the AJC 
samples no respondents are under 24 and all those 30–39 must be classified in one age category (here classified in the youngest 
cohort). 
12 An evaluation of the AJC survey data on emotional attachment to Israel, available across more than two decades, should 
provide some evidence for sorting among these interpretations. Are the changes in strong and weak attachments shifting for the 
total group consistently over time, and especially for people of the same age in each survey year? Ted Sasson and Charles 
Kadushin are currently studying these trends. 
13 This prevalence of the Orthodox among young adults is found in the AJC, NJPS, and AJIS samples from the 2000–2005 
period. For the argument that sampling issues are at the root of the phenomenon, see Saxe et al. (2007)— which, however, 
implies that virtually all of the rise in Orthodox numbers in the young adult birth cohort can be attributed to the sampling issues. 





again, for our purposes what matters is the effect of this reality (that the Orthodox are more 
prevalent among the younger than older adults), even if we cannot be certain of its source. The 
effect is that patterns of lower attachment in the younger cohorts will be partially masked by the 
Orthodox responses. Thus, among respondents 24–39, 40–59, and 60 +, 50%, 49%, and 60%, 
respectively, report that being Jewish is very important to their daily lives. When the Orthodox 
are excluded, the corresponding figures hew more closely to the expected age pattern: 41%, 
46%, and 57%. 
I have stressed metro status and age because these are variables one might have expected 
to operate on the sense of Jewish cohesion and, indirectly through that cohesion, on political 
opinion about the West Bank future. Whatever the case that can be made for household income 
operating in the same way, or even gender, I have included these two variables mostly to 
stabilize the models and anticipate any suggestion that ignoring them would sharply affect the 
analysis. Unfortunately, information on educational attainment does not appear in the public-use 
datasets for most survey years (although it was collected). One might think that the income 
variable could therefore act partially as a crude proxy for education (with which income is 
correlated); I will use the 2003 dataset (which includes all the relevant variables) to test this idea 
below. 
 
Emotional Attachment to Israel vs. Opinions about West Bank Choices 
Each year, the AJC survey asks “How close do you feel towards Israel (very close, somewhat 
close, somewhat distant, or very distant)?” Most American Jews report on the “close” side of the 
continuum. Not surprisingly, more traditional religious orientations and stronger Jewish 
attachments are positively associated with the reported emotional ties to Israel. More striking, 
about half (51%) the respondents who report a strong Jewish attachment do not report feeling 
“very close” to Israel. If we exclude the Orthodox and the affiliated Conservatives, the figure 
climbs to 62% who report a strong Jewish attachment, but not a “very close” attachment to Israel 
(not shown). American Jews appear to be able to distinguish their feelings about being Jewish 
from their feeling towards the Jewish state, and so we also have an interesting range of emotional 
                                                                                                                                                             






attachment to Israel among even that half of the respondents who claim that being Jewish is 
“very important” to them. 
 
Table  2.   Feeling Close to Israel and the Importance of Being Jewish
Question Response   % by importance of being Jewish 
Very close 49 12 5
Somewhat close 40 54 27
Somewhat distant 9 28 38
Very distant 2 6 30
Total 100 100 100
Notes: Based on AJC survey years 2000-01 and 2003-5.







How close do 
you feel to 
Israel?   
 
 
However, a general emotional attachment to Israel is not the same as a political opinion 
about the foreign-policy choices facing the state. The questions that concern proposed West 
Bank changes are therefore more directly relevant to us. Moreover, we cannot view emotional 
attachment to Israel as a direct cause of political opinion about the conflict; for some, surely, the 
causal arrow may point the other way. That is, their uncertainties about Israeli policies leads to 
some cooling of their emotional attachment. The same, of course, may be said about some other 
measures—for example, Jewish attachment may be affected by Israeli policies, too, or (working 
in a different direction) respondents may have become more conservative in general political 
orientation because of condemnation of Israel by the left. But those are more indirect 
connections; the closeness of emotional attachment to Israel and views of the West Bank options 
are especially likely to be mixed together. Consequently, I concentrate on the explaining the 
political opinions in the rest of the analysis. Towards the end of that analysis, I will return to the 
association between emotional attachment and views of proposed West Bank changes, even if we 
cannot be sure about the causal priority of the associated variables.  
 
 
Responses to Proposed Changes on the West Bank: A Composite Measure  
Respondent opinions about West Bank options do not change in any systematic way across the 





samples as one large sample, and exploit the advantages of the large resulting sample size. In 
multivariate analysis, it will also be possible to control for sample year. That control will 
generally prove inconsequential, confirming the impression from Appendix Table A1 that annual 
fluctuations over these few years are much less interesting than the diversity of opinion across 
subgroups of American Jews in each year.
14  
I created a composite measure for acceptance of West Bank changes from the questions 
about a Palestinian state, the status of Jerusalem, and the dismantling of settlements. I grouped 
the responses to these three questions into four basic categories along a continuum from 
acceptance to rejection of proposals for West Bank change, each category including roughly a 
quarter of all respondents (22%–30%; see Table 3).  
 
                                                 
14 I have treated the sample as though it were a true random sample. Actual sampling variance is no doubt  
larger, but we have no way to know how to calculate it from the information on data collection provided by the AJC. The 
standard for a true random sample at least gives us some basis for not generalizing wildly from small Ns. In a true random 
sample, when 25% of the Orthodox and 40% of others express a particular opinion (N=270 and 2730 respectively for three 
survey years), the true difference in proportions is estimated at + or – 6 percentage points at the .95 confidence level by the 






Palestinian State Jerusalem Settlements Three Changes Components Summary
yes yes all accept all 6
yes yes some 19
subtotal 25
yes no all all but Jerusalem 4
yes no some 18
subtotal 22
yes yes none mixed 5
yes no none 6
no yes all 1
no yes some 6
no yes none 5
no no all 1
subtotal 24
no no some reject 12
no no none 16
subtotal 28
Total 100 100
Total: N 3597 3597













Source: See Table 1
Table 3.   Creating the Composite Measure for Acceptance of West Bank Changes: The Three 
Component Questions and Responses to Them
Percent of All Respondents
Notes: The composite measure is available for 2001 and 2003-5. Between 9% and 13% of respondents in each year 
failed to respond to at least one of the three component questions; they do not appear in the top panel above (N=420). For 
regression analysis, only responses from 2003-2005 can be used because two background variables are unavailable for 
2001; 2712 cases used, 290 others deleted for missing dependent variable data (10%); responses for the three years are 
within one percentage point of those shown that are based on four years of survey data.
Separate Responses to Each of the Component Questions (including other responses)









In general, 65% of respondents would accept dismantling some or all settlements, 55% 
support a Palestinian state, and 41% would accept a change in the status of Jerusalem. However, 
there is an important complexity here. The questions dealing with the Palestinian state and 
Jerusalem call for yes or no answers. The question about willingness to dismantle settlements as 
part of a peace agreement asks the respondent to specify all, some, or none. Not surprisingly, 
about half the respondents (53%) said they would accept dismantling some settlements for peace. 
A third (32%) oppose dismantling any settlements, and only an eighth (12%) supported 
dismantling all in exchange for peace. Now, some is a very elastic term; it could refer to almost 
none or to almost all settlements. I assigned those who gave this middle-of-the-road reply to a 
given category of the composite measure on the basis of their responses to the other two 
questions that make up the that measure.  
Accordingly, the group most willing to accept compromise includes those who will 
accept a Palestinian state, changes in the status of Jerusalem, and dismantling of all or some of 
the settlements. The group least willing to accept compromise include those who oppose a 
Palestinian state, changes in the status of Jerusalem, and dismantling of some or none of the 
settlements.
15 There are also two intermediate categories, the first of these is a coherent position, 
the second less so. The first includes the 22% of respondents who accept a Palestinian state and 
the dismantling of some or all settlements, but reject changes in the status of Jerusalem (only this 
last item distinguishes them from the category most accepting of proposed changes). The second 
intermediate position includes respondents who gave mixed answers, not easily consistent or 
classifiable (Table 3). 
 
So Where do American Jews Stand? 
The simplest summary of American Jewish response to the proposed West Bank changes is this. 
First, about a quarter of respondents provided responses that are too mixed to comprehend, so we 
should focus on the other three-quarters. Second, among these, about two out of three support a 
Palestinian state “in the current situation” and dismantling at least some of the Jewish settlements 
                                                 
15 Note that had I imposed more stringent criteria, the most and least compromising groups would have been very much smaller. 
Those accepting a Palestinian state, changes in the status of Jerusalem, and willing to dismantle all (rather than all or some) 
settlements comprise only 6% (rather than 25%) of respondents. Those rejecting a Palestinian state, changes in the status of 
Jerusalem, and willing to dismantle none (rather than some or none) of the settlements comprise 12% (rather than 28%) of all 
respondents. Thus, the group unwilling to accept any compromise is about twice as large of the group prepared to accept every 





on the West Bank in the context of a peace. However, third, only one of those two is prepared to 
accept a change in the status of Jerusalem, even in the context of a peace (Table 3). Put 
differently, those who reject all three proposals amount to about a third of the respondents with 
interpretable views and about a quarter of all respondents. 
   
Which Jews Hold Which Opinions? 
The Uniqueness of Orthodox Opinion 
The clearest concentration of rejectionist sentiments is found among the Orthodox. Only 7% of 
the group are in the most and 64% in the least supportive categories of the composite measure 
for acceptance of West Bank change (Table 4). Thus, Orthodox rejection is by no means limited 
to the Jerusalem question. Indeed, only 13% of the Orthodox are found in the second category 
(accepting other changes, but rejecting division of Jerusalem). These figures represent the 
strongest association between opinion about the West Bank and any subgroup of respondents—






accept 3 reject Jer. mixed reject total
Religious Attachment
Orthodox 7 13 16 64 100
Conservative--synagogue member 18 33 20 29 100
Conservative--other 26 18 31 25 100
Reform--temple member 28 27 24 21 100
Reform--other 27 20 29 23 100
Just Jew 31 20 27 22 100
All NON-Orthodox Respondents 27 23 26 25 100
Importance of Being Jewish
Very important 21 26 25 28 100
Somewhat important 30 21 26 23 100
Not important 38 17 29 17 100
Metro Area of Residence
NYC metro 21 25 24 30 100
Other major Jewish concentrations 28 24 26 22 100
Other U.S. (Northeast + North central) 27 26 22 25 100
Other U.S.  25 25 26 24 100
Age Group
24 - 39 21 23 30 26 100
40 - 59  27 20 26 27 100
60 and older 29 26 24 21 100
Education
High school or less 24 14 39 23 100
Some college 21 15 34 30 100
Four years of college 29 22 22 27 100
Five or more years higher education 28 25 18 29 100
Gender
Male 30 27 20 22 100
Female 23 19 31 27 100
Feel Close to Israel
Very close 17 29 23 31 100
Somewhat close 28 24 24 25 100
Somewhat or very distant 34 16 32 17 100
General Political Orientation
Extremely liberal, liberal 34 24 24 18 100
Slightly liberal, middle of the road  27 24 26 24 100
Slightly-extremely conservative 19 20 27 34 100
Notes: Non-Orthodox respondents comprise 91% of all respondents.
For comparable data including the Orthodox, see Appendix Table A5.
Source: See Table 1
Table 4.   The Composite Measure for Acceptance of West Bank Changes: Non-Orthodox Respondents Only 
(after the first panel)
Data on changes in sovereignty and settlements are available for 2001, 2003-5; data on subgroups also available for these years, 
except: religious attachment (2003-5), metro area (2003-5), education (2001, 2003). Missing data were trivial except for the 
summary measure (10%, including not sure/don't know) and education (7%).
Appendix Table A1 presents the percentage of all respondents (including Orthodox) who chose 
each response in a survey year.







Moreover, multivariate analysis confirms that no matter what other available variables 
are controlled, the coefficient on Orthodoxy remains much the largest (Appendix Table A3). It 
is, for example, at least five times as large as the coefficient for the affiliated Conservatives, and, 
in most regressions, three to six times as large as that for “very important” Jewish attachment. 
Moreover, no more than a third of the magnitude of the coefficient on Orthodoxy appears to be 
shared with other background factors—and virtually none of its strength is lost when our four 
demographic measures (age, place, gender, income) are included in the regression models. On 
the other hand, the coefficient on New York residence loses about 40% of its power when 
Orthodoxy is included in the model. Finally, only because of the Orthodox does religious 
orientation explain a hefty proportion of all the explained variation in opinion about the 
proposals for West Bank change: 2.19%. To appreciate the figure, note that the total variation 
that all our measures taken together can explain is 5.63% (Models 2 and 17 in Appendix Table 
A3). 
  Because the Orthodox political opinions are so distinctive, and the Orthodox are so 
concentrated in specific categories of other background variables as well (residence, Jewish 
attachment, and even age), it is best to limit the remainder of the analysis to the non-Orthodox. 
Otherwise, we will forever be wondering how much of each result is due to the Orthodox effect. 
For the reader who wishes I had chosen otherwise, Appendix Tables A3 and A4 include versions 
of all multivariate models, as well as critical tabulations with the Orthodox added back in.
16 
 
Other Traditional Religious Orientations 
With the Orthodox omitted, religious differences are strikingly less important for explaining the 
diversity of political opinion about proposed West Bank changes. The greatest concentration of 
rejectionist opinion is now among the affiliated conservatives. However, that concentration is a 
far cry from the opinions we just observed: 18% are found in the most and 29% in the least 
supportive categories of the composite measure for acceptance of West Bank change. Moreover, 
for this group the Jerusalem question is driving the figures: another 33% of its members are 
                                                 
16 In fact, a close comparison of regression analyses run both ways (Appendix Tables A2 and A3) shows that for the most part it 
would be adequate simply to include the control that isolates the Orthodox rather than omit them—three-way interactions do not 
appear to play much of a role and including the control for the Orthodox does not make the interpretation of other variables 
difficult. To the contrary, it is generally striking how similar the coefficients on the other variables are in both sets of regressions. 
This is not really surprising since the Orthodox are, after all, only 9% of sample members. Nevertheless, focusing on the non-
Orthodox in regressions is still cleaner and it does affect some of the discussion (for example, in connection with the amount of 





found in the second category, which differs from the first only on the Jerusalem issue. Thus, 51% 
of the affiliated Conservatives are found in the first two categories taken together compared to 
29% in the fourth category; for the Orthodox, the comparable figures were 20% in the first two 
vs. 64% in the fourth.  
Two-thirds of the American Jewish respondents are less traditionally oriented in terms of 
religion than either the Orthodox or the affiliated conservatives (as are half of all respondents 
who report that being Jewish is “very important” to their daily lives). Among this large majority, 
the fraction in the category most accepting of the proposed West Bank changes is somewhat 
larger than among the affiliated Conservatives—27–31% of all Reform Jews and those who 
report that they are “just Jewish” are found there. But the difference reduces to the Jerusalem 
question. We just saw that 51% of the affiliated Conservatives are found in the two more 
supportive categories of the composite measure; so, too, 47%–55% of the Reform and “just 
Jewish” groups.
17  
In sum, more than nine-tenths of American Jews are not Orthodox and among them, 
opinion about West Bank changes varies relatively little across compared to within traditional 
categories of religious orientation.
18 Indeed, within every category of the non-Orthodox religious 
orientations we find this startlingly similar split of great consequence, namely roughly a quarter 
accept all three changes, another quarter accept all but Jerusalem, and about a quarter reject 
changes. The regression analyses establish the same point: with the Orthodox removed, religious 
orientation explains only about a seventh as much of the variation in proposed West Bank 
changes—0.27%, down from 2.19% (Model #2 in Appendix Tables A3 and A4). Indeed, most 
differences of religious orientation do not rise to the level of statistical significance; only the 





                                                 
17 The Reform movement’s leadership has voiced concern about the direction of Israeli policy, and urged compromise, more 
often than that of the other large denominations. This stand may find a very modest reflection in the fact that among the affiliated 
Reform Jews, the odds of being in the two most accepting categories compared to the most rejecting is 55:21. But note that for all 
non-Orthodox Jews it is 50:25. See Table 4. 
18 The major exception, to repeat, is the smaller proportion of affiliated conservatives in the first category and the larger 






Among the non-Orthodox, half say that being Jewish is very important to their daily lives (Table 
1). They are moderately more rejectionist—a few percentage points more—on the proposed 
West Bank changes than are others, especially in accepting changes over Jerusalem. Thus, 
among the non-Orthodox, 27%, 23%, 26%, and 25%, respectively, are found in the first through 
fourth categories of the composite measure. Among the non-Orthodox who report that being 
Jewish is very important to their daily lives, the comparable figures are 21%, 26%, 25%, and 
28%, respectively.
19 When the affiliated conservatives (35% of this group) are removed along 
with the Orthodox, the division of opinion of course shifts, but it still remains very stark across 
the four categories of our composite measure for acceptance of West Bank change: 27%, 23%, 
26%, and 24%, respectively. 
In the multivariate analysis, I control for Jewish attachment as a way of ensuring that the 
results are not greatly affected by those with severely attenuated attachments. One might object 
that the control is not enough, that the structure of the models would differ if I had included only 
those who report that being Jewish is very important to them. However, notice that the power of 
Jewish attachment to explain the variation in political opinion about the West Bank is, in fact, 
stunningly low (0.18%); so it can hardly be supposed that the regressions would look very 
different if we excluded respondents in some categories of that variable. In any case, I did rerun 
some regressions with the sample limited to respondents with strong Jewish attachment and the 
there is no consequential change in results (Appendix Table A4). 
 
General Political Orientation 
Jewish response to West Bank territorial compromise might well be associated with how 
strongly one identifies as a liberal or conservative in politics generally. Of course, as I have 
already mentioned, the process of political opinion formation that lies behind such an association 
is anything but simple: it may be that many people shifted increasingly to the right as they came 
to feel that the left was pushing Israel too hard, but it is still worth exploring the strength of the 
association even if we cannot resolve questions about how the opinions have come to be what 
they are.  
                                                 





There are two useful measures of political outlook in the AJC surveys. One is party 
affiliation (Republican, Democrat, Independent) and the other is general orientation (from very 
liberal through very conservative). Not surprisingly, those who report themselves liberal or very 
liberal are also far more likely to report themselves as Democrats rather than Republicans (61% 
to 30%) and conversely, the conservatives align the other way (30% Democrat to 51% 
Republican; Table 5a).
20 The liberals are notably more likely to accept West Bank territorial 
compromise than the conservatives (Table 4). Thus, among the liberals, 34% and 19%, 
respectively, were in the categories most and least accepting of compromise, whereas among the 
conservatives, the corresponding figures were 17% and 40%.  
 
 
                                                 
20 The survey includes seven categories of political orientation; I have collapsed these to three larger categories for simpler 
analysis: liberal (including very liberal and liberal), comprising 27% of respondents; middle-of-the-road (including somewhat 
liberal and middle-of-the-road), 48%; and conservative (including somewhat conservative, conservative, and very conservative), 
25%. In logistic analysis, about 12% of the independent explanatory power of political orientation (measured by –2LL) is lost by 





Table 5.   Political Orientation and Party
a. Percent Affiliated with Each Party by General Political Orientation
Liberal Middle Conservative Any
Republican 27 34 51 36
Democrat 61 42 30 44
Independent 12 24 20 20
Total 100 100 100 100
Any party 27 47 25 100
b. Position on West Bank Changes by Party 
Accept 3 25 25 24
Reject Jerusalem 22 24 25
Mixed 26 23 25
Reject 27 28 27
Total 100 100 100
c. Percent who Feel Close to Israel by General Political Orientation
Very close 30 26 31
Somewhat close 43 46 44
Distant 26 28 25
Total 100 100 100
Source: AJC surveys, 2003-5
For composite measure, see Table 4. For source see, Table 1.
Notes: For responses to the composite measure for acceptance of West Bank 









In the light of all this, it is puzzling to find that party affiliation had no impact whatsoever 
on the acceptance of West Bank territorial compromise (Table 5b): among Democrats, 25% were 
in the most and 28% in the least accepting category, whereas among Republicans the figures 
were 25% and 27%. Multivariate analyses (not shown) show the same result: party affiliation 
explains nothing about the willingness to accept our composite measure for acceptance of West 





conclusion is that we should focus further attention on the explanatory force of general political 
orientation rather than party affiliation. 
  Notice in passing also that general political orientation predicts nothing about how close 
respondents feel towards Israel (Table 5c). Among liberals, 30% feel very close and 26% distant; 
among conservatives, the comparable figures are 31% and 25%. If Jews are made increasingly 
uncomfortable by Israel’s policies and/or those who feel very close to Israel are made to feel 
uncomfortable in the liberal camp, than those still liberal should be less likely than conservatives 
to feel very close to Israel. Perhaps the hypothesis that support for Israel has driven Jews to the 
right could be reconciled with the findings here (that emotional attachment is as strong among 
right and left) by introducing the dimension of time. We might speculate that over time the 
proportion in the liberal column who feel close to Israel may have changed little, but the number 
of all Jews who could balance their liberalism and the left’s criticism of Israel declined; those 
who no longer could balance these views moved to the more conservative columns. Perhaps, but 
the simplest form of the hypothesis that support for Israel drives Jews to the right would have led 
one to predict what we do not find here: that even today there would be an association between 
general political orientation and emotional attachment to Israel. 
In any case, unlike emotional attachment to Israel, our dependent variable on the political 
choices (namely, views of the proposed West Bank changes) is indeed strongly associated with 
general political orientation—and more strongly associated than are either religious orientation 
or Jewish attachment. Differences between liberals vs. centrists and centrists vs. conservatives 
together explain about twice as much variation in opinion about proposed West Bank changes as 
do those other two variables together (Models 3 and 4 in Appendix Table A2).  
 
Demographic Factors 
New York metro-area residents are moderately less likely than other non-Orthodox Jews to 
support the proposed West Bank changes (Table 4). Moreover, the multivariate analysis shows 
that this New York distinctiveness is strikingly resistant to explanation in terms of any of our 
other background variables—it is not reducible to New York concentrations of religious or 
political outlooks, or age or income groupings, for example.  
  The age differences, as I mentioned earlier, are more subtle. Younger compared to older 





generations, or as a result of life-cycle changes by which adults come to feel more attached to 
Israel as they age. Thus, other things being equal, we expect a positive relationship between age 
and emotional attachment to Israel. Working in the opposite direction, however, is the fact that 
the Orthodox are disproportionately young and strongly attached to Israel. We have eliminated 
the Orthodox from this stage of the analysis precisely in order to avoid such complexities. So we 
expect, and find, a positive association between age and emotional attachment to Israel among 
the non-Orthodox. Finally, we also expect that those who are most emotionally attached will, on 
average, be least willing to compromise about the West Bank. With apologies to members of the 
peace camp who are highly attached to Israel emotionally, we hold this expectation on the 
assumption that, in general, greater emotional attachment leads, on average, to a greater interest 
in the historic homeland and/or to a greater anxiety that security is being traded for peace efforts. 
Our expectation, then, is that among the non-Orthodox, we will find a negative association 
between age and acceptance of West Bank change.  
In fact, however, the association is positive both in the bivariate association (Table 4) and 
in multivariate analysis (Appendix Table A2). Indeed, when other factors are taken into account 
the positive association between age and acceptance of proposed West Bank changes is notably 
stronger than the bivariate association observed in a two-way table. After all, some of the 
variables connected to our expectation of a positive association between age and emotional 
attachment—such as Jewish attachment and emotional attachment to Israel—are positively 
correlated with age and negatively correlated with acceptance of the proposed West Bank 
changes (Figure 1). This positive association between age and acceptance of proposed West 
Bank changes is not a function of any one year’s survey: it is observable in each year’s data for 













Figure 1. Selected Measures by Age Group—NON-Orthodox Only (except Figure 1a) 
Percentage Orthodox 
Non-Orthodox respondents only (91% of all respondents)
Jewish Attachment: The Importance of Being Jewish in Daily Life Emotional Attachment to Israel: I feel…
 Composite Measure for Proposed West Bank Changes
Notes: For responses to the three component questions of the composite measure, see Appendix Figure 1A. For source, see 
Table 1.
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The striking point is not so much the strength of the positive association, gross and net, 
between age and acceptance of proposed West Bank changes—although the positive associations 
are statistically significant, and when other variables are controlled, they are stronger rather than 
weaker. But even so, the positive age effects are not huge. Rather, the important point is that 
these statistically significant associations run in the opposite direction from that we would have 





We can only speculate about an explanation; the data were not collected to test anything 
of this kind. The finding underscores the importance of the difference between emotional 
attachment to Israel (or Jewish attachment) and political judgments about the future of the West 
Bank. That the former is negatively correlated with age does not mean that the latter is. Also, any 
age-related connections with general political orientation seem to have little impact on this 
relationship (Models 7 and 12 in Appendix Table A2). If there is something intrinsic about age 
or birth cohort itself, then perhaps the outlook of those who have followed the conflict for a 
much longer period is somehow relevant—their weariness of the struggle or their wariness that 
Israel might again become more vulnerable to its enemies (as vulnerable as it was perceived to 
be during the 1948–67 period). Also, the finding calls out for more work on two assumptions 
stated above: is it really the case that a greater emotional attachment to Israel among American 
Jews leads, on average, to either greater concern with losing the historical homeland of the West 
Bank or to a higher anxiety that West Bank compromises involve risking security for peace 
efforts. 
The effect of gender is also largely independent of any other controls: men are more 
likely to support the proposed West Bank changes. Finally, support is also positively associated 
with household income; nevertheless, income explains less of the variation than any other 
characteristic (.06%; Model 9 in Appendix Table A2).  
I mentioned earlier the possibility that income may be operating partly as a crude proxy 
for educational attainment, with which it is no doubt correlated. We have educational attainment 
data only for one relevant year, 2003. The crosstabulation of educational attainment and opinion 
about proposed West Bank changes (in Table 4) should dampen any hopes that educational 
differences determine political opinion on our subject. Direct regression analyses of 2003 data 
confirms the same point (Models 3–5 in Appendix Table A4). Indeed, while the association with 
income is statistically significant, the association with education is not, and the association with 
income is virtually unchanged when educational attainment is also controlled. The only 
interesting effect of greater schooling in Table 4 is that the more educated are decidedly less 
likely to be found in the “mixed” category, which includes responses that seem internally 
contradictory. Less schooling may thus be positively correlated with less knowledge of the 





attainment in most of our regression work (because the variable is not available in the datasets 
for 2004–5) does not appear to be of much consequence. 
  When the four demographic and the three cultural-political characteristics are entered 
together in a regression model, the coefficients remain virtually unchanged (or rise slightly) from 
the magnitude they showed when each type of variable was entered separately (Models 5, 11, 
and 12 in Table A4). Moreover, there is no dramatic case of any one of the seven variables 
explaining away most of the effect of another. A moderate amount of masking is noticeable, 
particularly as mentioned earlier in connection with age. However, most noteworthy is that so 
many coefficients remain largely unchanged when the other variables are added to the model and 
also how little of the variation—less than 2.5%—is explained by all seven explanatory variables 
acting together.  
 
How Much Did We Explain?  
The fact that we cannot explain a substantially larger percentage of the diversity in non-Orthodox 
acceptance of proposed West Bank change is perhaps not in itself so very damning, since high 
proportions of variation are rarely explained by individual-level regression models operating on 
large samples. On the other hand, recall that about a quarter of respondents fell into each of the 
four categories of the composite measure, and we observed that this diversity of opinion tended 
to vary only by modest to moderate amounts across the non-Orthodox religious orientations and 
still less when opinions about changes in the status of Jerusalem were ignored. Thus, in Table 4, 
no subgroup difference among the non-Orthodox remotely approaches the difference between 
Orthodox views and those with other religious orientations. A simple way to appreciate the point 
is to note how many of the “accept 3” and “reject” cells of that table (the two extreme choices) 
list percentages in or just beyond the twenties.
21 Since about a quarter of all non-Orthodox 
groups are found in each category of the composite measure, the subgroup cells are fairly close 
to what we would predict from the entire group. Of course, Table 4 alone is not enough for 
certainty: there could be extreme masking of one variable’s effect by another; yet after our 
multivariate analysis we know that such dramatic masking is not to be found. The point here is 
not that there is little diversity in thinking about the West Bank future, but that the considerable 
                                                 
21 Moreover, the most divergent non-Orthodox cell in Table 4 (those for whom being Jewish is not important) covers barely a 





diversity is only moderately related to our explanatory categories. Yet these are standard 
explanatory categories of social analysis and we know that they are important for countless 
questions about American-Jewish life. They all matter for our questions, too, but they do not 
matter as much as we might have expected. Still, as the great divisions related to class, culture, 
and education that were associated with the process of upward mobility in the generations 
following mass immigration have declined, perhaps we must expect less of the social divisions 
usually studied (Goldscheider 2004). We cannot, however, be sure without more probing data on 
political opinions about the conflict. 
 
Generalized Security Concerns? 
The characteristics explored so far have not taped explicitly into the general concern that Israel is 
vulnerable is special ways. Such a concern might be stated thus: Israel is the small country of a 
small people who have been abused throughout history and the Israeli government is repeatedly 
pressured to take life and death risks for an elusive peace treaty that may prove worthless 
through no fault of its own. A related strand of opinion is that the Arab antagonists really do not 
want to return to the 1967 lines, but rather to eventually destroy the Jewish state. The diversity of 
feeling about Israel’s basic vulnerability might well be associated with the diversity of 
acceptance of proposed West Bank changes. Obviously, it might also be associated with other 
factors, like emotional attachment to Israel, as I mentioned earlier.  
We do not have a question that taps directly into the concern over Israel’s vulnerability. 
However, we do have a question that taps directly into our respondents understanding of Arab 
intentions. Each year the AJC asks, “The goal of the Arabs is not the return of occupied 
territories but rather the destruction of Israel (agree or disagree?).” A case can be made that this 
question is also somewhat related to the generalized concern over vulnerability. After all, Arab 
intentions are vastly more important if Israel is seriously threatened by those intentions. To put it 
differently, it would be consistent with the first concern (vulnerability) and at least suggestive to 
find that positive responses to this question are associated with negative views about the 
proposed West Bank changes described in the composite measure. This is, in any case, as close 






The responses to this question have varied considerably in recent years, from strong 
agreement (66%) in the year before Camp David II (AJC 2004) through stronger agreement still 
in recent years (78%–84% in 2002–2006; Appendix Table A1). Thus, during the years for which 
we have the datasets, agreement vs. disagreement was running at four to one. Nevertheless, the 
question is how much more likely the minority in disagreement were to accept West Bank 
changes.  
The answer is that they were very much more likely to do so. No other coefficient in any 
regression is more strongly related to acceptance of proposed West Bank changes for the non-
Orthodox population and only the coefficient on “liberal” (in general political orientation) is 
similar in magnitude (Appendix Table A2, Models 13, 14, and 17).  
 
Respondent Group
accept 3 reject Jer. mixed reject total
All Respondents 27 23 26 25 100
Arab intention to destroy Israel
y e s 2 22 42 62 81 0 0
no 42 20 24 13 100
Notes: Among all non-Orthodox respondents, 77% agreed, 19% disagreed, and 5% were unsure.
For details, see Table 4.
Source: See Table 1
Table 6.   The Composite Measure for Acceptance of West Bank Changes: By Views of Arab 
Intentions--Non-Orthodox Respondents Only
Proportion Giving each Response to Summary Measure
 
 
The coefficient on Arab intentions loses none of its force when all the other variables we’ve 
tested are taken into account. And, indeed, adding this variable to the model after the other seven 
variables have explained all they could increases the variation explained by 50% (from 2.36% to 
3.54%).
22  
The finding underscores the possibility that the diversity of views is partly related then 
not to the specifics of the proposals, but to the relation of any Israeli retrenchment to a 
generalized concern for the country’s vulnerability. Such a connection would hardly be a 
surprise; the point is the relative strength of this factor compared to others.  
                                                 
22 Since close to four-fifths of respondents give one reply to this question, the division of responses can only be associated with a 






Emotional Attachment to Israel 
Finally, we can now return to the matter of feeling emotionally attached to Israel. This feeling, as 
I have already had occasion to mention in passing, is not so very strongly associated with our 
composite measure for acceptance of West Bank change. The multivariate analysis confirms the 
point. The coefficient for very strong emotional attachment, for example, is half the size of that 
for distrust of Arab intentions and explains less than a third as much of the variation in the 
dependent variable. When added to the model after the other variables have explained all they 
can, emotional attachment to Israel explains relatively little additional variation (Models 12 and 
16 and Models 14 and 17 in Appendix Table A2). Again, political opinions about proposed West 






There are many dimensions to American Jewish opinion about the Middle East conflict; I have 
concentrated on opinion about the important policy choices that Israel faces. I argue that in the 
recent AJC surveys, these policy choices are clearest in connection with opinion about proposed 
West Bank changes—support for a Palestinian state, changes in the status of Jerusalem, and 
dismantling of Jewish settlements there.  
If the status of Jerusalem is ignored, American Jews tilt heavily towards compromise; 
with Jerusalem in the mix, opinion divides quite evenly across the four categories of the 
composite measure.  
                                                 
23 Notice, too, that agreement with the statement that Arab intentions are to destroy Israel and emotional attachment to Israel are 
positively associated with age and negatively associated with the composite measure, but age is positively associated with the 
composite measure. Consequently, when Arab intentions and emotional attachment are controlled, the coefficient on age rises to 














The availability of the recent AJC datasets makes it possible for us to transform the 
responses to the West Bank questions into single composite measure. Far more important, the 
datasets allow us to explore the connections between respondent characteristics and our new 
measure, and to do so with multiple characteristics simultaneously, not simply with one at a time. 
We can therefore anticipate the question that must arise for any reader of tables considering the 
impact of characteristics one at a time: are some of the observed associations reducible to others, 
or, alternatively, are some characteristics found to have a stronger impact on views of the West 
Bank future when other characteristics are controlled? 
We have examined associations between opinions of West Bank change and seven basic 
characteristics—Jewish attachment, traditional religious orientation, general political orientation, 
age, place of residence, gender, and household income. In addition, we explored the associations 
with emotional attachment to Israel and concerns about Israel’s vulnerability (however poorly 
the latter is measured by the available questions). All of these background factors are indeed 
connected to views of proposed West Bank changes. The negative association for the Orthodox 
is so strong that it seemed best to consider the rest of the population without them. 
The basic issue is not whether the background characteristics we consider are related to 
opinion about West Bank changes, but how and how strongly they are related. Religious 
orientation explains stunningly less after the Orthodox have been excluded. There is a modest 
negative association with traditional religious orientation, but it is quite weak. The same is true 
for Jewish attachment. General political orientation explains about twice as much as both of 
these Jewish characteristics together. All the demographic factors matter to a moderate extent as 
well. All but one of the nine variables we explored matter in the expected way except age. From 
the well-established positive association between age and emotional attachment to Israel, I 
hypothesized that age would be negatively associated with acceptance of West Bank 
compromise. But the association is statistically significant in a positive direction, with and 
without controls for other background characteristics. At present, I have little to offer but idle 
speculation as to why this should be so.  
While all our explanatory variables do matter, their combined impact appears to explain a 
modest proportion of the diversity of views on proposed West Bank changes. But the political 
opinion we can effectively study is restricted; we need more refined and systematic work on 





conclusion must be that a substantially large fraction of diversity of opinion that we can measure 
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APPENDIX A.   SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES 
Appendix Table A1.   2000-2005 AJC Survey Questions Used in this Analysis         
                   
Question       Percent Giving each Response by Year         
  Responses              
       2000 2001 2003 2004  2005  sum:  all   2006* 
              available    
              years,   
              2000-05    
1) In the current situation, do you favor or oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state?         
 Favor      na 53 54 57  56   55   54
 Oppose        39 41 37  38   39   38
 Not  sure        8 5 6  6   6   9
                   
      2) In the framework of a permanent peace with the Palestinians, should Israel be willing to 
compromise on the status of Jerusalem as a united city under Israeli jurisdiction?         
 Yes      36 44 42 42  36   40   40
 No      57 50 54 53  60   55   52
 Not  sure      7 6 4 5  4   5   7
                   
      3) As part of a permanent settlement with the Palestinians, should Israel be willing to dismantle all, 
some, or none of the Jewish settlements on the West Bank?         
 All      na 9 12 12  15   12   na
 Some        53 57 57  46   53    
 None        34 29 29  36   33    
 Not  sure        4 2 2  3   3    
                   
      4) Do you support or oppose the Israeli government's decision to build a security fence separating 
Israelis and Palestinians?       
 Agree      na na na 69  73   71   na
  Disagree         28  24   26    
  Not  sure          3  3   3    
                   
      5) Do you agree with the following statement? "The goal of the Arabs is not the return of occupied 
territories, but rather the destruction of Israel."         
 Agree      69 73 81 84  78   77   81
 Disagree      23 23 16 13  18   19   13
 Not  sure      8 4 3 3  5   5   6 
Appendix Table A1 (continued). 2000-2005 AJC survey questions used in this analysis       
                     
6) How close do you feel to Israel?                   
 Very  close    28 28 31 31  36   31   37
 Fairly  close    46 43 43 44  41   43   39
 Fairly  distant    18 21 18 19  18   19   16
 Very  distant    7 6 8 6  5   7   6
 N o t   s u r e      0 010   1       2
                     
7) How important would you say being Jewish is in your own life?               
 Very  important    59 48 54 50  55   53   61
 Fairly  important    33 38 34 38  33   35   28
  Not very important    8 14 12 11  12   11   10
                     
8) Do you think of yourself as….  // [combined with:] Do you belong to a synagogue or temple?**         
 Orthodox     10 7 8 7  10   9   8
  Conservative [+ yes: member]  25 31***** 23 23 25   24   35*****
  Conservative [+ no: nonmember]  8 11 11  9   10  
  Reform [+yes: member]  19 29***** 15 16 17   17   31*****
 Reform  [+no:  nonmember]  12   15 13 13   13  
 Just  Jewish    25 33 28 30  26   27   24
                     
      9) I'm going to read you a list of political views that people might hold. They are arranged from 
extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale?***         
  Extremely liberal, liberal  27 25 23 28  29   27   30
  Slightly liberal, middle of the road   53 50 49 47  44   49   44
  Slightly - extremely conservative  18 24 26 23  26   23   25










Appendix Table A1 (concluded). 2000-2005 AJC survey questions used in this analysis       
                    
10)  Place  of  residence****               na 
  New York metropolitan area  22 na 20  23 25   22    
  Other major Jewish pop.centers   50   51  47 39   47    
  Other: Northeast and North central  12   11  11 9   11    
 Other      15   18  20 27   20    
                    
11)  Age  group                 na 
  24 - 39      19 19 17  15 22   18    
  40 - 59      43 40 43  38 45   42    
  60 and over    37 41 41  46 33   40    
                    
12)  Sex                   na 
 Male      44 48 50  50 49   48    
 Female      56 52 50  50 51   52    
                    
13) Household income (mean of logged income: estimated from 23 income categories)          na 
 Mean      10.875 10.849 10.792  10.891 10.932   10.868    
 Standard  deviation    0.726 0.790 0.823 0.795 0.838   0.796    
                    
      Notes: * Individual-level datasets cover for 2000-2001 and for 2003-5. The most recent summary frequencies are for 
the following year and are included here for comparison (from the published report, AJC 2006).       
             ** Conservative and Reform responses to the first question were subdivided by responses to the second question 
(second question not available for 2001).       
       *** Seven categories collapsed here to three.                 
     
     
       **** Based on census division and MSA size information. The second category, major Jewish centers other than 
the NYC metro area include Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Baltimore, centers in Connecticut, four 
centers in Florida, and two in California.       
       ***** In 2001, data relevant to Question 8 do not cover membership.             
     
      Source: All 2006 data from AJC 2006, 1-10. All other data:  From the AJC survey public-use samples (see note to Table 1). 







Appendix Table A2.  The Composite Measure for Acceptance of West Bank Changes: A Regression Analysis--NON-ORTHODOX Respondents
Parameters Models
                                         (parameter estimates are shown in  log-point  units: 100 * natural logs)
# 1  #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17
Intercept: most accepting -85 ** -101 ** -82 ** -158 ** -124 ** -110 ** -93 ** -135 ** -219 ** -244 ** -231 ** -261 ** -43 ** -207 ** -91 ** -252 ** -202 **
Intercept: accept 2 (not Jerusalem) 23 a 7 26 * -49 ** -15 -3 15 a -26 ** -112 * -136 ** -121 * -149 ** 66 ** -92 b 17 b -139 * -87
Intercept: mixed responses 134 ** 118 ** 138 ** 64 ** 99 ** 109 ** 127 ** 86 ** 0 -23 -7 -32 180 ** 27 128 ** -21 33
2005 survey year 666 9 9 64 7 86 67 9 1 0 457
2004 survey year 10 10 10 12 10 11 7 11 12 8 8 6 17 a 11 9 4 8
Being Jewish very important -39 ** -35 ** -39 ** -41 ** -30 * -18 -12
Being Jewish somewhat important -22 a -21 -20 -21 b -14 -12 -8
   [no Orthodox included]
Affiliated Conservatives -33 ** -20 a -16 -23 * -25 * -18 -21 a
Unaffiliated Conservatives -21 b -14 -14 -14 -13 -15 -14
Affiliated Reform 71 8 1 8 1 0 4 1 0 3
Unaffiliated Reform -17 -13 -18 -17 -21 b -19 -23 a
Extremely liberal, liberal 77 ** 78 ** 83 ** 74 ** 83 ** 74 **
Middle of the road 41 ** 40 ** 46 ** 42 ** 44 ** 41 **
NYC metro -29 * -31 ** -28 * -27 * -27 * -26 *
Other major Jewish metros 3 1 -2 -5 0 -3
Other Northeast + North central 34 4 1 2 1
Age 24-39 -37 ** -41 ** -39 ** -43 ** -62 ** -54 ** -70 **
Age 40-59 -31 ** -35 ** -33 ** -35 ** -42 ** -41 ** -47 **
Male 39 ** 36 ** 43 ** 43 ** 44 ** 44 **
Log of household income 1 0* 1 4* * 1 1* 1 3* 1 5* * 1 4* * 1 6* *
Arab intention is to destroy Israel -90 ** -91 ** -89 **
Feel very close to Israel -47 ** -55 ** -46 **
Feel somewhat close to Israel -17 a -21 * -12
6561 )
intercept (+ survey yr.) + covariates 6548 6543 6535 6505 6479 6550 6542 6532 6556 6533 6498 6405 6478 6328 6537 6383 6311
% explained by covariates 0.19 0.27 0.39 0.85 1.24 0.17 0.29 0.43 0.06 0.42 0.95 2.36 1.25 3.54 0.37 2.71 3.81
Levels of statistical significance (Wald chi square): ** p. < .01 *   .01 < p. < .05) a   .05 < p. < .075 b  .075 < p. < .10
Notes:  1) The dependent variable is the composite measure for acceptance of West Bank change. For detail, see Table 4.
             3) All models are based on a cumulative logit model (reference cell parameterization).
 fuller regression models 
              2) The analysis is limited to the AJC datasets for 2003-5 (as only these include all questions). All 
regressions are based on 2,592 cases, less Orthodox= 2367 cases. An additional 410 cases (14%) were omitted for 
missing data. Most missing data involved a respondent failing to answer one of the three political questions that 
comprise the composite measure (the dependent variable).
            4) Omitted categories of the categorical prior variables are: just Jew (for religious attachment), other (for 
metro area), over 60 (for age group), female (for gender), feel somewhat distant of very distant from Israel (for 
emotional attachment), disagree (for Arab intention to destroy Israel), Log of household income, with 27 categories, 
Measure of variation explained by model  (-2LogL; for intercept and survey year only -2LogL=








Appendix Table A3.  The Composite Measure for Acceptance of West Bank Changes: A Regression Analysis--ALL Respondents
Parameters Models
                                         (parameter estimates are shown in  log-point  units: 100 * natural logs)
# 1  #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 #16
Intercept: most accepting -86 ** -102 ** -83 ** -179 ** -127 ** -116 ** -103 ** -144 ** -230 ** -251 ** -238 ** -238 ** -47 ** -183 ** -93 ** -230 **
Intercept: accept 2 (not Jerusalem) 19 6 25 * -72 ** -18 -10 2 -38 ** -125 ** -145 ** -130 ** -126 * 61 ** -67 14 -117 *
Intercept: mixed responses 125 ** 115 ** 134 ** 35 ** 94 ** 95 ** 108 ** 67 ** -21 -40 -23 -11 168 ** 49 119 ** -2
2005 survey year 10 8 8 13 10 10 8 11 13 10 9 8 13 10 8 6
2004 survey year 14 13 12 17 * 13 17 a 13 17 * 17 * 13 13 9 22 * 13 13 6
Being Jewish very important -58 ** -37 ** -41 ** -42 ** -31 * -19
Being Jewish somewhat important -20 b -19 -19 -19 -11 -10
Orthodox -173 ** -156 ** -140 ** -137 ** -134 ** -123 **
Affiliated Conservatives -33 ** -19 b -15 -21 a -23 * -16
Unaffiliated Conservatives -21 -13 -13 -14 -13 -14
Affiliated Reform 7 19 18 12 6 12
Unaffiliated Reform -17 -13 -18 -17 -21 b -19
Extremely liberal, liberal 94 ** 81 ** 85 ** 75 ** 85 **
Middle of the road 53 ** 41 ** 46 ** 42 ** 45 **
NYC metro -48 ** -49 ** -27 * -26 * -26 *
Other major Jewish metros 2 -1 -1 -3 0
Other Northeast +North central 0 2 2 -1 0
Age 24-39 -42 ** -45 ** -42 ** -38 ** -56 ** -48 **
Age 40-59 -30 ** -35 ** -33 ** -35 ** -43 ** -42 **
Male 35 ** 31 ** 42 ** 42 ** 43 **
Log of household income 1 0* 1 4* * 1 2* * 1 1* 1 3* * 1 1*
Arab intention is to destroy Israel -100 ** -91 **
Feel very close to Israel -70 ** -55 **
Feel somewhat close to Israel -20 * -21 *
7168 )
intercept (+ survey yr.) + covariates 7129 7011 7002 7076 6936 7135 7144 7143 7163 7135 7083 6862 7063 6783 7105 6838
% explained by covariates 0.54 2.19 2.32 1.28 3.23 0.46 0.33 0.34 0.07 0.45 1.18 4.26 1.46 5.36 0.88 4.60
Levels of statistical significance (Wald chi square): ** p. < .01 *   .01 < p. < .05) a   .05 < p. < .075 b  .075 < p. < .10
Notes: See notes to Appendix Table A2. For source, see Table 1.  
  fuller regression models  regression on cultural, religious, and political indep. variables
Measure of variation explained by model  (-2LogL; for intercept and survey year only  -2LogL=










Appendix Table A4.  The Composite Measure for Acceptance of West Bank Changes: A Regression Analysis--NON-ORTHODOX Respondents
**supplemental regression analyses
Parameters Models
                                         (parameter estimates are shown in  log-point  units: 100 * natural logs)
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5
Intercept: most accepting -267 ** -205 -293 ** -96 ** -284 **
Intercept: accept 2 (not Jerusalem) -137 b -71 -187 a 5 -178 b
Intercept: mixed responses -28 41 -62 124 ** -53
2005 survey year 11 9
2004 survey year 25 a 26 *
Being Jewish very important -35 -38
Being Jewish somewhat important -11 -11
   [no Orthodox included]
Affiliated Conservatives -28 b -24 -19 -19
Unaffiliated Conservatives -5 -4 -37 b -37 b
Affiliated Reform 24 18 -27 -26
Unaffiliated Reform -25 -30 -12 -11
Extremely liberal, liberal 70 ** 68 ** 77 ** 78 **
Middle of the road 40 ** 38 ** 38 * 38 *
NYC metro -34 * -32 * -21 -21
Other major Jewish metros -8 -6 -4 -4
Other Northeast +North central 29 27 15 16
Age 24-39 -50 ** -70 ** -43 * -42 *
Age 40-59 -39 ** -52 ** -40 ** -38 **
Male 41 ** 43 ** 42 ** 46 **
Log of household income 9 13 b 18 * 17 a
Arab intention is to destroy Israel -95 **
Feel very close to Israel -30
Feel somewhat close to Israel 5
Missing education data -28 -31
High school or less -9 16
Some college -23 -10
Four years of college -3 2
Measure of variation explained by model (-2LogL; for intercept and survey year only = 3281 ) 2195.8
intercept (+ survey yr.) + covariates 3198 3152 2149 2193 2147
% explained by covariates 2.53 3.94 2.14 0.11 2.24
Levels of statistical significance (Wald chi square): ** p. < .01 *   .01 < p. < .05) a   .05 < p. < .075 b  .075 < p. < .10
Notes: See notes to Appendix Table A2. For source, see Table 1.  
For models 1 and 2, there were 1189 respondents included in regressions. For models 3-5, there were 793 respondents included in regressions.
Dataset includes only respondents who reported that being 
Jewish was "very important" in their daily lives--compare to 
Models 12 and 17 in Table A2
Dataset limited to 2003 survey year which includes 
information on respondents' educational attainments




accept 3 reject Jer. mixed reject total
All Respondents 25 23 24 28 100
Importance of Being Jewish
Very important 20 25 23 32 100
Somewhat important 29 22 25 24 100
not important 34 19 30 17 100
Metro Area of Residence
NYC metro 19 22 23 36 100
Other major Jewish concentrations 28 23 25 24 100
Other U.S. (Northeast + North central) 25 25 23 28 100
Other US  25 25 25 25 100
Age Group
24 - 39 19 21 27 32 100
40 - 59  25 20 25 30 100
60 and older 28 25 24 24 100
Education
high school or less 24 14 39 23 100
some college 21 15 34 30 100
four years of college 29 22 22 27 100
five or more years higher education 28 25 18 29 100
Gender
male 28 26 20 26 100
female 22 18 30 30 100
Feel close to Israel
v e r y  c l o s e 1 52 52 13 8 1 0 0
somewhat close 28 23 23 26 100
somewhat or very distant 34 16 32 18 100
General Political Orientation
Extremely liberal, liberal 34 24 24 19 100
slightly liberal, middle of the road  25 24 25 26 100
Slightly - extremely conservative 17 18 25 40 100
Arab Intention to Destroy Israel
y e s 2 12 32 53 2 1 0 0
no 42 20 24 13 100
Notes: For comparable figures on the non-Orthodox respondents (91% of all respondents) and on survey 
years used for each question, see Table 4. For sources, see Table 1.
Appendix Table A5.   Responses to the Composite Measure for Acceptance of West Bank 
Changes--Orthodox Jews Included






Favor Palestinian State "In Current Situation"?
Change Jerusalem Status for Peace?
Dismantle West Bank Settlements for Peace?
Appendix Figure A1.  Responses to the components of the composite measure for 
West Bank Change, by Age Group--NON-Orthodox Only
Notes: For responses to the composite measure by age group, see Figure 1. For source, see Table 
1.



































APPENDIX B. AN HISTORICAL CRITIQUE OF AJC’S ISRAEL-ORIENTED QUESTIONS 
AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESPONSES 
 
Consider the following questions—admittedly imperfect—that could test for knowledge about Israel, 
attitudes towards Israelis, and political options facing Israel.  
 
A. Knowledge about Israel  
A1.   In what year did Israel become a state?  
A2.   In what year did it take control of the West Bank?  
A3.  Do Arab Israeli and Jewish Israeli children go to the same schools? 
 
B. Attitudes about Israelis 
B1.   To what extent do you think each of the following descriptions apply 




• militaristic  
• democratic 
• excessively nationalistic 
• religiously extremist 
 
B2.  What is your impression of the following groups in Israel? (very  
favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, very unfavorable, not sure):  
• West Bank settlers 
• secular or nonreligious Israelis  
• modern Orthodox Israelis  
• ultra-Orthodox Israelis 
• Israeli Arabs 
 
 C. Political Choices 
   C1.   Is the Israeli government doing enough or not doing enough to carry out peace 
agreements it has signed with the Palestinian Authority (PLO)? 
C2.  Should the United States apply pressure on the Israeli prime minister to advance the 
peace process, even if this creates a strain in U.S.-Israel relations, or should the United States not apply 
pressure? 
   C3.  Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Public criticism of Israel by 
established American Jewish organizations is useful for prodding the Israeli government in the peace 
process.” 
C4.  Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “American Jews should not 
publicly criticize the policies of the duly elected government of Israel.” 
Before the reader concludes not merely that I do not know how to construct a decent question, but 
that I am hopelessly biased, he or she should consider that all of these questions have appeared in the 
American-Jewish Committee surveys at one time or another during the 1980s or 1990s. They all have 
their limitations, but they do show that probing questions are possible and would surely help, especially 
when examined together so that general attitudes and knowledge about Israel could be used to illuminate 
political positions. 
A review of the responses will be useful. In 1989, 64% of American Jews could correctly give the 
year Israel declared her independence (A1, above). In that context, it is less surprising to learn that only 
40% knew the year Israel took control of the West Bank (A2); only a third knew that Israeli Jews and 





been to Israel. And while the overwhelming majority in the early nineties claimed to follow news about 
Israel “closely,” only 40% claimed to follow “very closely” (Phillips, Lengyel, and Saxe 2002).  
The questions dealing with images of Israelis (questions B1–2, above) may seem to grasp at no 
more than stereotypes, but the AJC regularly asks respondents which American ethnic groups seem more 
or less anti-Semitic. Why not ask for the respondent’s impressions of various types of Israelis as well? 
However, the question was asked only in 1991 (Phillips, Lengyel, and Saxe 2002). The results were 
intriguing. I report here only the surprisingly high negative images. Only 5% found Israelis racist “to a 
great extent” (B1, above); however, another 36% found them racist “to some extent” for a total of two-
fifths of American Jews agreeing that Israelis were at least racist to some extent. Moreover, the proportion 
who believed that Israelis were “hardly at all” racist was an identical 41% (the last fifth saying they were 
not sure). Likewise, 34% thought the Israelis excessively nationalistic to a great extent and another 40% 
to some extent; the comparable proportions on the religiously extremist question are 9% and 41% 
(Phillips, Lengyel, and Saxe 2002). A much higher proportion agreed that Israelis were militaristic, either 
to a great extent (32%) or to some extent (48%). Perhaps, then, militaristic may have been interpreted by 
many to mean “involved with military concerns,” but the answers would be consistent with negative 
images on the part of a surprisingly large minority of American Jews. 
The question about specific subgroups of Israelis (B2) was also asked only once, in 1997. Eleven 
percent reported a very favorable view of West Bank settlers, 36% a somewhat favorable view, 29% 
somewhat unfavorable, 12% very unfavorable, and 13% unsure. Thus, the opinion of the settlers was split 
right down the middle, with most respondents avoiding the very strong options. Opinion of secular 
Israelis was less divided, with a fifth responding “very favorable” and another half “favorable.” The 
modern Orthodox were seen favorably by moderately fewer in each category (8–10 percentage points 
less) and the ultra-Orthodox were unfavorably viewed by two out of three. Forty-fiver percent viewed the 
Israeli Arabs favorably (nearly all in the weaker category) and 38% unfavorably (AJC 1998). 
The AJC only asked once (in 1999) whether the Israeli government is doing enough to carry out 
its pledges to the PA (question C1 above). Again, why a variant of this question is not used more 
regularly is hard to grasp; 49% of respondents answered yes, 43% answered no—surely a striking 
division deserving follow-up. The tables at the back of that year’s AJC report offer some additional 
insight. Those with higher educational attainments were notably more likely to disagree (high school or 
less: 59% yes; five or more years of higher education: 44% yes); and the Orthodox were more likely to 
agree. By contrast, there was no difference by age.  
Another side of the same question was whether the Palestinian Authority was doing enough to 
meet its obligations to Israel. Nearly all (88%) thought not, with no consistent differences by education or 
denomination. Responses also varied remarkably little by whether the respondent reported feeling “very 
close to Israel” (92%) or distant from Israel (83%). Thus, the question on whether Israel was doing 
enough produced fascinating differences, while the question on whether the PA was doing enough 
produced virtually none. Yet the AJC chose to ask the latter in multiple years while ignoring the former. 
 The question about American pressure on the Israeli prime minister (question C2, above) was 
also asked only once (in 1998). Forty-five percent replied yes, 52% replied no. Interestingly, the parallel 
question was asked about pressuring Arafat; 69% replied yes and 28% no. That more Jews favor pressing 
Arafat than pressuring the Israeli prime minister is hardly news, but that 45% of them favored pressuring 
the Israeli leader is more surprising (American Jewish Committee 1999). 
The last two questions (C3–C4) dealt with the appropriateness of public criticism of Israel, the 
first by “established American Jewish organizations,” the second by “American Jews.” In reply to 
question C3 (about organizations), 27% agreed, 41% disagreed, and 32% were not sure. Thus, a clear 
majority of those with an opinion did not think it helpful that the organizations prod the peace process by 
criticizing Israel in public. Since a third had no opinion, the division of opinion was really quite extensive 
(put differently, only two-fifths of respondents held the most common opinion). This is a relatively clear 
cut question and it would have been interesting to observe whether responses have varied over the years, 





By contrast, the AJC asked question C4 (the appropriateness of criticism by American Jews) 
between 1981 and 1998. The proportion of respondents who disagreed with the statement that “American 
Jews should not publicly criticize…Israel” fell below 55% only once (49% in the year of the first 
Lebanon War, 1982) and reached a high of 71% in 1995. The question had the disadvantage, perhaps 
unavoidable, of putting the matter in a way that seemed to invite a defense of free speech: of course, if 
someone felt strongly enough, he or she had the right to criticize (Phillips, Lengyel, and Saxe 2002). The 
AJC eventually replaced the question by another, used continuously through 2004: “Regardless of their 
individual views on the peace negotiations with the Arabs, American Jews should support the policies of 
the duly elected government of Israel.” This formulation generated greater agreement: 60–63% now 
agreed with the statement, 32–36% disagreed. The new formulation may have been an attempt to bypass 
the issue of free speech and to tap more directly into the question of the appropriateness (rather than the 
constitutional right) of criticism, but the change came at the expense of clarity. When and how should 
“individual views” be expressed? When and how should American Jews “support the policies?” 
American Jewish feelings about dissent from Israeli government positions is critical, but in this paper I do 
not analyze the responses to this AJC survey question, not least because these ambiguities make it 
difficult to interpret the answers. 
 
 
 